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In this manuscript we discuss the device-independent conference key agreement (DICKA) protocol
[Phys. Rev. A 97, 022307 (2018)]. We show that the suggested honest implementation fails, because
perfect correlated measurement results and the required Bell-inequality violation cannot be achieved
simultaneously, in contradiction to what is claimed. We further show via semidefinite programming
that there cannot exist any suitable honest implementation in the tripartite setting, rendering the
DICKA protocol incomplete.
In Ref. [1], Ribeiro et al. proposed a protocol to
generate a secret key among multiple parties, called
device-independent conference key agreement (DICKA).
The security proof crucially depends on the observa-
tion of genuine multipartite entanglement certified by
a particular violation of a multipartite Bell inequal-
ity, the Mermin-Ardehali-Belinski˘ı-Klyshko (MABK) in-
equality [2–4]. Here, we analytically prove that the hon-
est implementation of the DICKA protocol cannot yield
a non-zero secret-key rate for an odd number of par-
ties and provide numerical evidence that the first non-
trivial even-numbered case fails as well. Finally, we use
semidefinite programming (SDP) to prove that there can-
not exist any honest implementation that leads to a non-
vanishing secret-key rate for three parties, thus proving
the incompleteness of the DICKA protocol. We use the
same notation as Ref. [1].
MABK inequality: Consider a Bell setup with N par-
ties called Pauli with two dichotomic observables P
i
0 , P
i
1
∀i ∈ [N ] := {1, . . . , N}. We require an explicit expres-
sion for the odd-partite MABK operator. Let F2 = {0, 1}
denote the finite field with two elements, from which we
obtain the vector space FN2 of bit strings of length N .
We define the Hamming weight
H(x) :=
∣∣{1 ≤ i ≤ N | xi = 1}∣∣ (1)
of a bit string x = (x1, . . . , xN ). For now, let N be an
odd integer and define the set
LN :=
{
x ∈ FN2
∣∣∣∣ H(x) = N − 12 mod 2
}
, (2)
i.e., if (N − 1)/2 is odd (even) the set LN contains all bit
strings x with an odd (even) number of bits 1.
Proposition – Let N ≥ 3 be odd. An explicit form of
the N -MABK operator is given by
MKN =
1
NN
∑
x∈LN
(−1)ξN (x)
N⊗
i=1
P ixi , (3)
where ξN (x) :=
N−1
4 −
H(x)
2 and NN := 2
N−1
2 .
∗
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A single application of the recursion rule in Eq. (8) of
Ref. [1], yields the MABK operator for N even. For all
N ≥ 3 the N -MABK inequality is given by the corre-
sponding MABK operator MKN , according to:
MKN :=
∣∣tr (MKNρP(1...N))∣∣ ≤ 2m−12 , (4)
where ρP(1...N) denotes the quantum state shared among
all N parties and m ∈ [N ] indicates the maximum num-
ber of parties that are entangled via ρP(1...N) . A violation
of the bound for m = N − 1 certifies genuine N -partite
entanglement [5], which is crucial for the security proof
of the DICKA protocol.
There are |LN | = 2N−1 different operators in the sum
of Eq. (3). Thus, the N -MABK value MKN contains
EN = 2
N−1 different expectation values. For general
N ≥ 2, the number of different expectation values EN
and the normalization factor NN are given by
EN = 2
2⌊N2 ⌋, and NN = 2⌊
N
2 ⌋. (5)
DICKA protocol and honest implementation: Alice
has a measurement device with two inputs X ∈ {0, 1},
and each Bobk has three inputs Y(k) ∈ {0, 1, 2} for
k ∈ [N − 1]. The DICKA protocol consists of two dif-
ferent types of measurement rounds, one for key gener-
ation (type 0), where (X,Y(1...N−1)) = (0, 2, . . . , 2), and
one for parameter estimation (type 1), where X,Y(k) are
chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}. In the hon-
est implementation and in the asymptotic limit, the par-
ties have access to infinitely many copies of the pure
N -Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state GHZN :=
|GHZN 〉 〈GHZN |, with |GHZN 〉 :=
|0〉⊗N+|1〉⊗N√
2
, which
are distributed to the parties. Alice and the Bobs mea-
sure the observables (see section between Protocol 2 and
Thm. 4 of the Ref. [1]):
(i) For X = 0 (X = 1) Alice’s observable is σz (σx).
(ii) For type-0 measurement rounds, i.e., for Y(k) = 2
all Bobs measure the observable σz . And for type
1, i.e., Y(k) ∈ {0, 1} they measure observables "that
are defined by a strategy that maximally violates
the N -MABK inequality when the measurements
are performed on an N -GHZ state."
2We want to emphasize the following remarks. First, note
that in any DI quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
col, at least one party, say Alice, is obliged to incorporate
at least one measurement setting that is used for key gen-
eration rounds also in the parameter estimation rounds,
to detect a potential pre-programming of the devices by
the adversary. And second, in order to minimize the er-
ror correction information that is publicly communicated,
and given that the N -GHZ state is measured, every party
necessarily needs to measure the observable σz in type-0
rounds of the protocol, see Thm. 1 of Ref. [6]. Therefore,
Alice has to use A0 = σz in both types of measurements.
We claim that under these conditions there exist no mea-
surement settings for the Bobs such that the N -MABK
value exceeds the bound 2
m−1
2 form = N−1 in Ineq. (4),
at least for odd N . Hence, the security of the DICKA
protocol cannot be guaranteed.
Let PN denote the N -qubit Pauli group, we define
S :=
{
S ∈ PN
∣∣∣ S |GHZN 〉 = |GHZN 〉}, (6)
i.e., S denotes the stabilizer group of the N -GHZ state.
The group S is generated by theN independent operators
G1 := σ
⊗N
x , and for all j ∈ {2, . . . , N} : (7a)
Gj :=
j−2⊗
i=1
1
(i)
2 ⊗ σ
(j−1)
z ⊗ σ
(j)
z ⊗
N⊗
i=j+1
1
(i)
2 (7b)
where the superscript denotes the corresponding subsys-
tems. In general, the projector of any stabilizer state
can be written as the normalized sum of all of its sta-
bilizer operators [7, 8]. We obtain for GHZN and with
s := (s1, . . . , sN ) the representation:
GHZN =
1
2N
∑
s∈FN2
(σs1x )
⊗N(σs2z ⊗ σs2+s3z ⊗ . . .
· · · ⊗ σsN−1+sNz ⊗ σ
sN
z
)
. (8)
No-go theorem for N odd: With the general form of
the pure N -GHZ state in Eq. (8) and the properties of
the N -MABK inequality, cf. Eq. (5), we state our initial
claim:
Theorem 1 – Let N ≥ 3 be odd and let the N parties
perform the honest implementation of the DICKA
protocol. Then, the N -MABK value cannot exceed the
bound that certifies genuine multipartite entanglement
among all N parties.
Proof – Let N ∈ N be an odd integer and let
B
(k)
Y(k)
:= β
(k)T
Y(k)
σ, ∀k ∈ [N − 1], Y(k) ∈ {0, 1} (9)
be a general qubit measurement, where
β
(k)
Y(k)
:= (β1, β2, β3)
(k) T
Y(k)
≡ (βx, βy, βz)
(k) T
Y(k)
, (10a)
σ := (σ1, σ2, σ3)
T ≡ (σx, σy, σz)
T (10b)
denote normalized Bloch vectors and a vector that con-
tains the Pauli matrices. Recall that the product of Pauli
matrices is given by:
σjσk = δj,k12 + i
3∑
l=1
ǫjklσl, (11)
where δj,k and ǫjkl denote the Kronecker delta and the
Levi-Civita tensor, respectively. With Eq. (8) and for
A0 = σz , we obtain for the expectation value:〈
A0
N−1⊗
k=1
B
(k)
Y(k)
〉
=
∑
s∈FN2
2
2N
δs1,0 δs2,1tr
(
B
(1)
Y(1)
σs1x σ
s2+s3
z ⊗
· · · ⊗B
(N−1)
Y(N−1)
σs1x σ
sN
z
)
(12)
for all Y(k) ∈ {0, 1}, where we used Eq. (11) and the fact
that Pauli matrices are traceless to establish
tr (σzσ
s1
x σ
s2
z ) = 2δs1,0δs2,1. (13)
Therefore, only operators with components s1 = 0 and
s2 = 1 in Eq. (8), yield a non-vanishing contribution to
the expectation value in Eq. (12). Now consider
B
(1)
Y(1)
σs1x σ
s2+s3
z =
3∑
i=1
β
(1)
i,Y(1)
σiσ
s1
x σ
s2+s3
z (14)
and note that we only get a non-vanishing contribution
to the expectation value in Eq. (12), if there remains no
non-trivial Pauli matrix in this expression. As s1 = 0
and s2 = 1, we see that s3 = 0 needs to hold. Re-
peating this argument reveals, that the only term in
Eq. (8) that potentially gives a non-zero contribution to
the expectation value, is the bit string s with alternat-
ing entries of 0 and 1. Here, we observe a fundamen-
tal difference between odd and even numbers N . For
N odd, the alternating pattern in s implies sN = 0,
thus for the observable of BobN−1 in Eq. (12), we obtain
B
(N−1)
Y(N−1)
σs1x σ
sN
z = B
(N−1)
Y(N−1)
1, which is traceless. Hence,
the expectation value in Eq. (12) necessarily vanishes if
A0 = σz , i.e., for all N ≥ 3 odd, we obtain:〈
σz ⊗
N−1⊗
k=1
B
(k)
Y(k)
〉
GHZN
= 0. (15)
The structure of the N -MABK Ineq. (4) is such that
half of the expectation values EN include the observable
A0 = σz. Thus, only EN/2 non-zero expectation values,
each of them upper bounded by +1, can be present. A
multiple application of the triangle inequality leads to
MKN = |tr (MKNρ)| ≤
1
2
EN
NN
= 2
N−3
2 (16)
as a generous upper bound on the N -MABK value. A
comparison with the bound that certifies genuine N -
partite entanglement, cf. Ineq. (4) for m = N−1, reveals
MKN ≤ 2
N−3
2 < 2
N−2
2 , (17)
which finishes the proof. 
3The even-partite case: The even-numbered analogon
to Eq. (15) is given by:
〈
σz ⊗
N−1⊗
k=1
B
(k)
Y(k)
〉
GHZN
=
N−1∏
k=1
β
(k)
z,Y(k)
, (18)
which is in general non-vanishing and thus prohibits an
analogous analytical proof of a similar no-go theorem
for even N . Numerical optimization procedures how-
ever, can be utilized to find the maximum possible N -
MABK value, where the maximization is done over all
Bloch components of all observables but A0 under the
constraints of normalization for each Bloch vector. For
N = 4, the maximization yields an upper bound of 1 for
the maximum 4-MABK value, which constitutes the clas-
sical bound. Thus, we obtain numerical evidence, that in
the first non-trivial even-numbered case of multipartite
DICKA, the honest implementation fails as well.
A device-independent generalization: The results pre-
sented so far hint at fundamental problems of the DICKA
protocol employing the MABK inequality. More pre-
cisely, perfect classical correlations and certified genuine
multipartite entanglement via an MABK-inequality vi-
olation seem to be incompatible. So let us move away
from the honest implementation. All we demand is that
there exists a set of observables and a quantum state that
perfectly correlate the measurement results of all parties
in type-0 measurement rounds of the DICKA protocol.
Besides this premise, no specific structure on the quan-
tum state and the (projective, dichotomic) measurements
are imposed. In this sense, it is a DI way to reinforce
the results presented so far. To do this, we employ the
Navasqués-Pironio-Acín (NPA) hierarchy [9], whose gen-
erality comes at the cost of being numerically expensive.
We thus restrict the discussion to N = 3 parties. Note,
however that the extension to largerN is straightforward.
Theorem 2 – Given a 3-partite quantum state ρ and a
set of observables
(
AX , B
(1)
Y(1)
, B
(2)
Y(2)
)
that lead to
perfectly correlated measurement results among all
parties in type-0 measurement rounds of the DICKA
protocol, then
MK3 ≤ 2
1
2 (19)
holds, i.e., the 3-MABK value cannot exceed the bound
that certifies genuine multipartite entanglement.
To show this theorem, let without loss of generality the
indices (X,Y(1), Y(2)) = (0, 2, 2) indicate the set of inputs
that yields perfect classical correlations. Let A±0 , B
(1)±
2 ,
and B
(2)±
2 denote the projectors onto the ±1 eigenstate
of the corresponding observables and define:
C := A+0 ⊗B
(1)+
2 ⊗B
(2) +
2 +A
−
0 ⊗B
(1)−
2 ⊗B
(2)−
2 . (20)
The solution of the following SDP, for which we use
Ref. [10], is the maximum 3-MABK value in this general
setting, subject to the constraint of perfect correlations.
max
AX ,B
(1)
Y(1)
,B
(2)
Y(2)
,ρ
∣∣tr (MK3ρ) ∣∣ (21)
subject to: tr (Cρ) = 1
The upper bound on the 3-MABK value obtained via
the solution of the SDP (21) coincides with the bound
that certifies genuine multipartite entanglement within
numerical precision. Thus, there cannot exist a quan-
tum state and a set of observables that simultaneously
perfectly correlate all parties and lead to the required 3-
MABK-inequality violation, which proves Thm. 2. The
N -partite generalization of the SDP (21) can be carried
out for arbitrary integers N at a proper hierarchy level.
Conclusion: We presented an analytical proof that
the honest implementation of the DICKA protocol pro-
posed in Ref. [1] fails for an odd number N of parties
and provided numerical evidence that the protocol fails
in the first non-trivial even-numbered case as well. We
furthermore proved via SDP that there cannot exist any
honest implementation of the DICKA protocol relying on
the violation of the MABK inequality for N = 3 parties,
thus proving its incompleteness. We finally conjecture
that the N -partite generalization of Thm. 2 holds also
true, which suggests that there cannot exist any honest
implementation of the N -partite DICKA protocol that
leads to a non-zero secret-key rate.
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